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Abstract
Some agents are better treated by the market than others. In our model this discrimina-
tion arises from statistical discrimination based on the observables on the background of the
individual (her parents). Advantages thus created increase the intergenerational correlation
of income. This has some strong implications. First, it implies that intergenerational mobil-
ity and income inequality should correlate negatively. Second, the amplification mechanism
generated by advantages may produce a multiplicity of steady states. Third, the introduc-
tion of “meritocracy” (informative signals on talent) may actually decrease mobility due to
general equilibrium effects: by increasing income dispersion, they also increase the value of
background.
1 Introduction
“ ‘We know all men are not created equal in the sense some people would have
us believe - Some people are smarter than others, some people have more opportunity
because they’re born with it, some men make more money than others, some ladies
make better cakes than others - some men are born gifted beyond the normal scope of
most men.’ ” ∼ Atticus Finch, To Kill a Mockingbird (Harper Lee, 1960)
Throughout the book To Kill a Mockingbird, Atticus Finch, the hero and father of the narrator
Scout, is a keen observer of humanity. He highlights to his daughter how people’s attitudes and
morality set them apart from one another and provides these socio-economic determinants of the
separation of some men from others: some men smarter; some have greater opportunities; and
some make more money (we say little in this paper on cake making ability). Of particular interest
to us are the opportunities with which we are born. We consider this: given that some people
make more money than others, to what extent is the dispersion of income, and its correlation
across generations, related to the inheritance of advantages. In so doing we attempt to go beyond
a story of capital market imperfections and consider how firms use the information available to
them.
The correlation between intergenerational income mobility and inequality was recently considered
by Alan Krueger in a presentation he gave to the Center for American Progress (Krueger (2012)).
He discussed the “Great Gatsby Curve,” the literary namesake of which provides an example, of
sorts, of upward mobility. Krueger’s illustration drew on data provided by Miles Corak and Figure
1 reproduces Corak’s version of the Great Gatsby Curve (Corak (2012)). Income inequality and
the intergenerational earnings elasticity are on the x- and y-axes respectively. We can see that
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Figure 1: Corak’s Great Gatsby Curve
more unequal countries have a greater correlation between the income of fathers and sons or, put
another way, that there is a negative correlation between income inequality and mobility.
There exist several explanations for this negative correlation in the literature. One such explanation
is given by the “distance effect” in Hassler et al. (2007). In their model, greater mobility leads
to a long-run equilibrium in which there are fewer unskilled workers relative to skilled. This
reduces the distance between their two incomes, which is their measure of income inequality, and
increases the ability of unskilled parents to pay for the eduction of their children. This feeds back
into increased mobility. Another explanation is provided in Solon (2004). In Solon’s model, both
intergenerational income elasticity and inequality are a function of the same factors, including the
inheritance of income generating traits and more policy-related factors such as the progressivity of
public human capital investment. This would again give rise to the upward sloping line illustrated
in figure 1. This paper will offer an alternative explanation – the inheritance of advantage.
To be clear, we are not talking, as Solon did, about the greater opportunity of the children of the
rich to accumulate talent. We assume that this is true, perhaps through some sort of capital market
imperfection allowing the rich to invest more in their children’s development. What we are talking
about is the greater efficacy with which the children of the rich inherit the ability to look talented.
This relates our paper to the literature on statistical discrimination (such as Coate & Loury (1993)
and Moro & Norman (2004)). We differ from these papers in that our firms discriminate based on
endogenously determined variables and do so within a dynamic model. This naturally produces
the observed negative correlation between mobility and inequality. As income inequality increases,
people differ more, and it becomes easier to identify talented individuals within society. As firms
become more certain about who is talented and who is not, this feeds back into income dispersion.
This feedback mechanism may lead to multiplicity of steady states. In addition, the better firms
get at identifying talent, the lower is mobility, both because the talented tend to be from rich
backgrounds and because one of the ways which firms identify talent is through information on
family background.
These are the two key points which we wish to highlight in this paper. First, that there exists
a multiplier effect whereby increased inequality improves the information available to firms when
selecting workers, reducing mobility and encouraging further inequality in the incomes that they
pay. When there is strong inheritability, in the sense that talent is closely related to family
background, this can lead to multiplicity. Second, that it implies a perverse effect from meritocracy:
if a meritocratic society is one in which firms can more readily identify the quality of workers
and pay them accordingly, this could decrease mobility. As a result, societies with meritocratic
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institutions (those in which it is easy to signal talent) should tend to have more inequality and less
mobility than those without. This is what we observe in the likes of the US and UK, with a heirarchy
of higher education institutions from the Ivy League and Oxbridge downwards, compared to the
Scandinavian countries with their more egalitarian educational institutions. We will elaborate
further on these points in the models which follow.
2 Labour market sorting where firms receive a signal on
parental income
In this section we will consider how firms react to a signal on the parental income of a worker.
This is going to be relevant to the firm because parental income and talent will be related in the
following way,
τ = α
(
y−1 − y−1
)
+ τ (1)
where τ is a worker’s talent, y−1 is his parent’s income, y−1 is the mean of parental income, and τ ∼
N
(
0, σ2τ
)
. The talent process is a function of parental income and luck, where the extent of the role
played by parental income is governed by the parameter α > 0. Talent is the post-education, pre-
labour force level of skill of a worker, and its development has a tournament component which will
keep average talent centered on zero. We do not consider the factors underlying this relationship
but you could imagine it being the result of capital market imperfections.
2.1 A firm’s beliefs about talent
There are firms which pay wages according to their beliefs about the talent an individual has. Let
θ1 be the information available to a firm. θ1 can be broken down into two elements: µ, information
on the distribution of income in the parents’ generation; and s1, a signal on y−1 given by,
s1 = y−1 + s1 (2)
where s1 ∼ N
(
0, σ2s1
)
. Firms do not, at this stage, receive a direct signal on talent. We assume
that the firm knows the distributions of s1 and τ .
It may seem unreasonable to the reader to assume that firms receive an observation (albeit a noisy
one) on parental income. It may be easier to think of it as an observation on an individual’s
background: where an individual grew up, how they speak, how they dress, and so on. Using this
information, the firm takes expectations of talent, conditional on the information available, in the
following way,
E (τ |θ1) = αE
(
y−1 − y−1|θ1
)
+ E (τ |θ1) (3)
Since both µ and s1 are independent of τ , the firms expectation of τ conditional on θ1 will be
equal to zero and the firm can concentrate on forming beliefs on parental income. To do this they
initially form their prior, conditional on µ, and then update it with the information contained in
an individual’s signal using Bayesian inference. This leads to an expectation of parental income
(as a deviation from its mean) given by,
3
DR
AF
T
E
(
y−1 − y−1|θ1
)
=
σ2y−1
σ2y−1 + σ
2
s1
(s1 − s1)
Substituting this back into equation 3 gives a posterior belief on talent of,
E (τ |θ1) =
ασ2y−1
σ2y−1 + σ
2
s1
(s1 − s1) (4)
ασ2y−1
σ2y−1+σ
2
s1
is equal to
στ,s1
σ2s1
which is the coefficient from an OLS regression of τ on s1. Thus the
firms adjusts away from their prior belief (zero) and towards the signal to the extent that a change
in the signal implies a change in talent. When parental income variance is high, the prior gives
little information as people are very different. The signal is more heavily used in determining
the posterior and hence talent. When parental income variance is zero, the prior gives perfect
information and the signal is disregarded. Our point, as we will see in the next section, is that
income variance is endogenous.
2.2 Steady State Beliefs
Suppose that firms set income equal to their belief about an individual’s talent having observed
their signal. They have no further opportunity to learn about the talent of their worker. We will
write this income as a linear function of the deviation of the signal from its mean value.
y = E (τ |θ1) = β1 (s1 − s1) (5)
where β1 can be read from equation 4. Since mean income is then zero in every generation, this
implies that the mean signal is zero. We can then write equation 5 as
y = E (τ |θ1) = β1s1 (6)
β1 measures the optimal reaction of the firm to the signal. The more the firms react to the signals,
the more income variance there is. But, as we saw above, the more income variance there is, the
more value there is in the signal relative to the prior and so the more the firms react to the signal.
β1 both causes and is a reaction to income variance.
By substitution from equation 2 we can calculate the variance of income as a function of the
variance in parental income and, by setting σ2y = σ
2
y−1 , the steady state income variance. This is
given by,
σ2y (β1) =

β21σ
2
s1
1− β21
if β1 < 1
∞ if β1 ≥ 1
We can see that, at least up to a point, σ2y is a function of β1. We also know from equation 4 that
β1 =
ασ2y
σ2y+σ
2
s1
or, more generally, β1 is a function of σ
2
y (which we shall call F (·)). Finding a steady
state value of β1 is thus a matter of finding a fixed point of the equation β1 = F
(
σ2y (β1)
)
which
is given by,
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Figure 2: Steady State for α < 1
β1 = F
(
σ2y (β1)
)
=
ασ2y (β1)
σ2y (β1) + σ
2
s1
=
{
αβ21 if β1 < 1
α if β1 ≥ 1
There are a maximum of three steady state values of β1: β1 = 0 will always be a steady state;
β1 = 1/α is a steady state when α is greater than one; and β1 = α is a steady state when α is
greater than one.
The simplest case is where α is less than one. In this instance there is only one steady state value
of β1 equal to zero, corresponding to a steady state income variance of zero. This is very intuitive.
If the firm pays every worker the same income then by equation 1 their children’s’ talent will be
distributed entirely by luck. By definition the firm can infer nothing about luck through the signal,
and so they ignore it and pay all the children the same income. The case where α is less than one
is shown in figure 2 where F (β1) is shorthand for F
(
σ2y (β1)
)
. The economy will always tend to
this steady state.
When α is greater than or equal to one there still exists a steady state with no income variance
and no reaction by the firm to an individual’s signal. This is stable in the sense that for small
perturbations around zero the economy will return to this steady state. There also exist two other
steady states: there is an unstable steady state where β1 is equal to
1
α ; and there is a stable steady
state with β1 equal to α. We are more interested in the latter. The situation where α is greater
than one is shown in figure 3.
The stable steady state with β1 equal to α has income variance tending towards infinity. As income
variance in the economy becomes very high, incomes will be so different that it will be perfectly
evident who is the child of whom. As a result the firm fully uses the signal to the extent that
parental income tells them about talent (α).
2.3 The feedback mechanism
The fact that two stable steady states may emerge is one of the main findings that we will consider
in the rest of this paper. When income variance is decreasing, firms care less about the signal
because people are increasingly similar and the signal is known to be uninformative. They use it
less and income variance continues to fall. When income variance is increasing, firms care more
5
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about the signal because it is becoming more informative and people more different. Increasingly
there is an extra meaningful dimension in which people differ. As firms use the signal more, this
feeds back into greater income inequality. As a result of this latter process, the emergence of a
portion of the population who are rich gives advantages to their children that go beyond their
talents - the ability to display their privileged upbringing allows them to maintain it for the next
generation.
3 Labour market sorting where firms receive a signal on
talent
In the model of section 2 the information set of the firm consisted of two parts: µ, prior information
about the distribution of income in the parent’s generation; and s1, a signal on parental income.
In this section we consider the actions of a firm when faced with an alternative information set
θ2. They receive the same prior information but an alternative signal, s2, on an individual’s talent
given by,
s2 = τ + s2 (7)
They do not receive signal s1. Talent is still given by equation 1 and income by E (τ |θ2). We
will model an improvement in meritocracy as a fall in σ2s2 since this improves the precision of the
signal and allows talent to be better identified and rewarded.
We calculate the posterior beliefs of the firm, given this new information, which gives it beliefs
about talent of,
E (τ |θ2) =
α2σ2y−1 + σ
2
τ
α2σ2y−1 + σ
2
τ + σ
2
s2
s2 (8)
The income that the firm pays a worker is a linear function of the new signal,
y = E (τ |θ2) = β2s2 (9)
where the value of β2 can be read from equation 8. From this we can quite easily calculate the
steady state income variance as a function of β2, remembering that σ
2
y = σ
2
y−1 in steady state,
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σ2y (β2) =

β22
(
σ2s2 + σ
2
τ
)
1− (αβ2)2
if β2 <
1
α
∞ if β2 ≥ 1α
We are now in a position to write the fixed point equation β2 = G
(
σ2y (β2)
)
where G (·) is the
coefficient of signal 2 from equation 8. This gives,
β2 = G
(
σ2y (β2)
)
=
α2σ2y (β2) + σ
2
τ
α2σ2y (β2) + σ
2
τ + σ
2
s2
=

(αβ2)
2
σ2s2 + σ
2
τ
σ2s2 + σ
2
τ
if β2 <
1
α
1 if β2 ≥ 1α
This is a similar result to what we found in section 2. There are up to two steady state values of
β2 less than
1
α given by,
β2 =
σ2s2 + σ
2
τ ±
√(
σ2s2 + σ
2
τ
)2 − 4α2σ2s2σ2τ
2α2σ2s2
We will call the lower of these β
2
and the higher β2. There is a third possible steady state: β2 = 1
for values of β2 greater than
1
α . We will consider two possible cases: in the first, σ
2
τ ≥ σ2s2 ; in the
second σ2τ < σ
2
s2 .
3.1 Steady state solutions where σ2τ ≥ σ2s2
The simplest case is where σ2τ ≥ σ2s2 . When this condition holds there is only ever one steady
state value of β2.
1 When the variance of talent is largely exogenous (σ2τ is high), and the signal
is precise (σ2s2 is low), a firms decision over how much to use the signal is largely independent
1Begin by considering α = 1. The three possible steady states are then: β2 = β2 = 1 for β2 < 1; β2 = β2 =
σ2τ/σ
2
s2
> 1 for β2 < 1; and β2 = 1 for β2 ≥ 1. The first two of these are contradictions, leaving only one steady
state with β2 = 1 and σ2y →∞. An increase in α causes the G (β2) curve to pivot upwards leaving the only steady
7
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of what other firms are doing. Since G (β2) measures the firms response to the prevailing β2 in
society it has little slope in this case. The steady state solutions for α in various ranges are shown
in figure 4.
3.2 Steady state solutions where σ2τ < σ
2
s2
Where σ2τ < σ
2
s2 there is a possibility that multiple steady state values of β2 exist. Intuitively
when σ2τ is low and σ
2
s2 is high, the variance in talent and quality of the signal are largely driven
by income variance. Since this is endogenously determined by the prevailing β2 in society, any
firm’s response to changes in the prevailing β2 is greater than in the previous section. This is why
G (β2) has a steeper slope and why we may reach more than one steady state value of β2. This is
illustrated in figure 5. Qualitatively the situation is very similar to what we saw for β1 is section 2.
There are two stable steady states: one at β2 = β2 with finite income variance; and one at β2 = 1
with income variance tending to infinity. We will refer to these as the “low” and “high” (stable)
steady states.
In this case there is an upper and lower bound on α, equal to one and α∗ =
σ2s2
+σ2τ
2
√
σ2s2σ
2
τ
respectively,
for which this multiplicity exists. For values of α less than one there is only one steady state value
of β2 less than σ
2
τ/σ
2
s2 . There is insufficient inheritance (parental income is not an important
enough driver of talent) for heavy use of the signal to translate into high enough quality that this
heavy use be sustained. For values of α greater than α∗ there is only one steady state value of β2
equal to one. Here the opposite is true. The quality of the talent signal generated by even a small
amount of income variance would be sufficient for the talent signal to be used more and more.
The feedback mechanism works in a similar way to what we saw in section 2.3. More income
inequality leads to greater dispersion of talent. This in turn leads to greater dispersion of the
signals and more value being given to the signals by firms, the combined effect of which is greater
income inequality.
state as β2 = 1. A decrease in α will cause β2 to fall below one, confirming it as a valid steady state value. β2 is
ruled out once we consider that any steady state solution must lie on the G (β2) curve which increases monotonically
to a maximum value of one at β2 = 1/α. Therefore any solution to β2 = G (β2) must have a solution with a value
less than or equal to one. A decrease in α below one would cause β2 to increase, and since it was already above one,
this rules it out as a steady state. β2 = 1 when β2 ≥ 1/α > 1 is also ruled out by contradiction. There is therefore
never multiplicity when σ2τ ≥ σ2s2 for any value of α.
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3.3 The curse of meritocracy I
We model an increase in meritocracy as a fall in σ2s2 . This improves the quality of the information
which firms have about talent and makes them better able to pay workers according to their talent.
From figure 5 we can see that a fall in σ2s2 causes the intercept of G (β2) to increase and, since
it must reach the same point at β2 = 1/α, the slope to fall.
2 β
2
increases. The steady state
intergenerational correlation of incomes is given by,
ρy,y−1 =
{
αβ2 if β2 < 1/α
1 if β2 ≥ 1/α
and so increases in the low steady state as σ2s2 falls. Improvements in meritocracy reduce mobility.
If we exogenously improve the quality of the signal, firms use it more, increasing the variance of
income and talent and further improving the quality of the signal (the feedback mechanism). As
this happens, firms get better at identifying talented individuals and paying them accordingly but
these individuals tend to be from rich backgrounds, reducing mobility. We produce the observed
negative correlation between mobility and inequality in the low steady state. The high steady state
is unaffected.
4 Labour market sorting where firms receive two signals
In the previous sections we have considered the actions of a firm trying to work out the talent of
individual workers with the aid of two alternative information sets, θ1 and θ2. We are now going
to combine these so that the firm’s information set, which we will now call θ′, has three parts; the
prior, µ, based on information on the distribution of income in the parents’ generation; signal s1 on
parental income given by equation 2; and signal s2 on talent given by equation 7. By reintroducing
the signal on parental income, we will show that this makes the curse of meritocracy worse. In
addition to firms being better able to pick out the talented, who happen to be predominantly from
rich backgrounds, they will also use the signal on parental income more.
We assume that talent is still given by equation 1. As before, the distributions of the errors s1 ,
s2 and τ are known to the firm and all are independently distributed.
Using Bayesian inference we can calculate the posterior beliefs of a firm conditional on the new
information set θ′. This gives a steady state posterior belief of,3
E (τ |θ′) = ασ
2
s2σ
2
y
α2σ2yσ
2
s1 +
(
σ2τ + σ
2
s2
) (
σ2y + σ
2
s1
)s1 + α2σ2yσ2s1 + σ2τ (σ2y + σ2s1)
α2σ2yσ
2
s1 +
(
σ2τ + σ
2
s2
) (
σ2y + σ
2
s1
)s2 (10)
2Formally, the slope of the G (β2) function is increasing in σ2s2 at any given value of β2 <
1
α
,
∂
∂σ2s2
[
∂G (β2)
∂β2
]
|
β2=β̂2<
1
α
=
2α2β̂2σ2τ(
σ2s2 + σ
2
τ
) > 0
3 The firm’s belief, given in equation 10 is a weighted average of three things: a prior on talent, E (τ |µ), equal
to zero; a belief about talent based on signal 1, E (τ |s1), equal to αs1; and a belief about talent based on signal 2,
E (τ |s2), equal to s2. As σ2y goes to infinity the prior is useless and the weights given to the other parts sum to one.
Similarly, if σ2s1 equals zero then the prior is useless since the first signal perfectly informs the firm about parental
income. Again it is thrown away. The weights given to other parts then reflect the extent to which parental income
and the second signal inform about talent and sum to one. When σ2s2 is zero only the second signal is used since
it perfectly informs about talent so tis weight is equal to one.
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Since firm’s pay wages according to expected talent we can now write the equation for income as,
y = E (τ |θ′) = β1s1 + β2s2 (11)
where β1 and β2 can be read from equation 10. This gives steady state income variance of,
4
σ2y (β1, β2) =

β21σ
2
s1 + β
2
2
(
σ2τ + σ
2
s2
)
1− (β1 + αβ2)2
if β1 + αβ2 < 1
∞ if β1 + αβ2 ≥ 1
This is a function of β1 and β2 which will be written σ
2
y (β1, β2).
We now have three equations in three unknowns: one each for steady state values of β1 and β2 as
function of the income variance which can be read from equation 10; and one for the steady state
income variance as a function of β1 and β2. Unfortunately finding analytical solutions to these
three unknowns for finite income variance is unmanageable. As such, we will proceed in a slightly
different manner to before.
4.1 The firm’s choice of β1 when the value of β2 is fixed
Since it is very difficult to find an analytical solution for β1 when β2 and σ
2
y are both being
endogenously determined, what we do instead is to exogenously impose a value of β2 and ask
the question: If this were the value of β2 which firms faced, what value(s) of β1 would they tend
towards? This method allows us to draw a reaction correspondence for β1 as a function of different
exogenously imposed values of β2.
To carry out this method, first we need to know the firms’ choice of β1 when β2 is exogenous. In
section 2 we noted that the posterior belief in equation 4 gave a value of β1 equal to the coefficient
from a regression of τ on s. This worked because the OLS regressor was the value of β1 which
minimised the variance of expected talent around its true value, which also happens to be how
a rational agent using Bayes rule behaves. We use this result again here. The value of β1 which
minimises the variance of E (τ |θ′) around τ is found by solving the minimisation,
minβ1E (τ − β1s1 − β2s2)2 (12)
which gives,
β1 = α (1− β2)
σ2y
σ2y + σ
2
s1
(13)
Fixing the value of β2 at zero shuts off the talent signal and returns us the model of section
2. Also, if β1 + αβ2 ≥ 1, we can see from above that income variance will tend to infinity and
4This is derived from,
σ2y = β
2
1
(
σ2y−1 + σ
2
s1
)
+ β22
(
α2σ2y−1 + σ
2
τ + σ
2
s2
)
+ 2β1β2
(
ασ2y−1
)
= (β1 + αβ2)
2 σ2y−1 + β
2
1σ
2
s1
+ β22
(
σ2τ + σ
2
s2
)
Solving for σ2y = σ
2
y−1 gives steady state income variance.
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β1 = α (1− β2). Since rearranging this gives β1 + αβ2 = α the requirement for the existence of
this infinite variance steady state is again α ≥ 1.
By substituting the steady state income variance and solving for β1, equation 13 gives the β̂1
reaction correspondence, where the “hat” indicates that this is the value of β1 that firms choose
given an exogenously imposed value of β2.
4.2 The firm’s choice of β2 when the value of β1 is fixed
We proceed in exactly the same manner as in the previous section. First, we want to solve
the minimisation in equation 12 for β2 to give us the firm’s choice of β2 given β1. Solving the
minimisation gives,
β2 =
α (α− β1)σ2y + σ2τ
α2σ2y + σ
2
τ + σ
2
s2
(14)
Substituting in the steady state income variance and solving for β2 gives us a correspondence β̂2
which describes the firm’s choice of β2 in reaction to a particular exogenously imposed value of
β1. Setting β1 equal to zero cuts off the signal on parental income and returns us to the model of
section 3 where the first signal plays no role. Also, when β1 + αβ2 ≥ 1 we again find that there is
a steady state at which income variance tends towards infinity and β1 + αβ2 = α.
4.3 A numerical example
The response correspondences in sections 4.1 and 4.2 do not easily lend themselves to analytical
solutions so a numerical analysis was carried out. The correspondences were drawn for the param-
eter values: α = 1.1; σ2s1 = 5; and σ
2
s2 = 4; σ
2
τ = 1. These were chosen based on what had been
learned from the one signal models – that to have multiplicity we require: α to be larger than
one but below some upper bound α∗; and the variance in the signal errors (σ2s1 and σ
2
s2) to be
large compared to the variance in the error on talent (σ2τ ). Figure 6 shows how the reaction corre-
spondences look for these parameter values. We have focussed only on non-negative, non-complex
values of β1 and β2.
Along the x- and y-axis, β1 and β2 are respectively fixed at zero. Thus the solutions along the axes
are as in sections 3 and 2 respectively. The highest of these solutions are connected by the line
β1 +αβ2 = α. From sections 4.2 and 4.3 we can see that the infinite variance solutions to both β̂1
and β̂2 lie on this line.
Where the two correspondences cross we find a finite variance steady state solution for β1 and β2
with the firm choosing β1 as a best response to β2 and β2 as a best response to β1. We find that
there are two of these, one with relatively low values of β1 and β2 and one with relatively higher
ones. The lower one is stable while the higher one is unstable.
The dynamics of the economy work as follows. Suppose β1 and β2 are fixed at certain values. This
will imply a certain income variance. Then imagine that at some point in time firms are allowed
to freely choose β1 and β2. They will do so taking the current income variance as given (since
it is our state variable). As a result they act as if they were on the saddle path with the same
variance as was created by the initial (β1,β2) combination. This is given by the point at which the
“isovariance” curve through this (β1,β2) cuts the saddle path. They will jump to a new point on
the saddle path, after which they continue to choose values of β1 and β2 which follow the saddle
path towards steady state. If the initial (β1,β2) was inside the higher of the two isovariance curves
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Figure 6: An example of multiplicity in the two signal model
illustrated, the economy will converge towards the lower stable steady state (with finite variance).
If it is outside this isovariance curve the economy will converge towards the high stable steady
state and infinite income variance. The equation of the saddle path is given by,
β1 = − σ
2
τ
ασ2s1
+
σ2s2 + σ
2
τ
ασ2s1
β2 (15)
It is worth noting that, where two stable steady states exist, it is always the case that one has
a lower level of both β1 and β2 and so there never exists two steady states which substitute one
signal for the other.
4.4 The curse of meritocracy II
In the two signal model, the intergenerational income correlation is given by,
ρy,y−1 =
{
β1 + αβ2 if β1 + αβ2 < 1
1 if β1 + αβ2 ≥ 1
Income variance in the finite variance steady state is given by,
σ2y =
β21σ
2
s1 + β
2
2
(
σ2s2 + σ
2
τ
)
1− (β1 + αβ2)2
Since the analytical solutions for β1 and β2 are unmanageable, and intergenerational mobility and
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Parameter Values the parameter may take
α 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5
σ2s1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
σ2s2 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
σ2τ 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 4.5, 5.0, 5.5, 6
Table 1: Parameter values for the numerical exercise investigating the curse of meritocracy
income inequality are functions of β1 and β2, it is also very difficult to solve analytically the effects
of a change in our exogenous parameters on them. We proceeded with a numerical analysis. First
we will examine the effects of a fall in σ2s2 . This is again how we now define an improvement in
meritocracy. There are two forces at work as σ2s2 falls: given β1 and β2 a fall in the noise will
decrease income variance which will lead to a reduction in β1 and β2 as firms respond; but for a
given income variance a fall in σ2s2 necessarily increases the use of the talent signal, which in turn
will increase income variance and the use of both signals.
We first define our parameter sets to be any combination of parameters from table 1. α may take
any one of fifteen values, σ2s1 any one of twelve, σ
2
s2 one of twelve, and σ
2
τ one of twelve. This
gives 25,920 possible combinations of parameters. However for some of those with α greater than
one, the finite variance steady state will not exist. We eliminated these cases and were left with
17,918 parameter combinations which produce a finite variance steady state.
For each of these steady states we decreased σ2s2 by 0.001. We interpret this as an exogenous
marginal increase in meritocracy. In all 17,918 cases for which a finite variance steady state existed,
income variance and the intergenerational correlation of incomes both increased. We graph the
effect of increasing meritocracy on inequality and mobility for a small number of different parameter
sets in figure 7. Meritocracy was measured as 1σ2s2
. The graph illustrates the increase in inequality
and fall in mobility which accompanies an increase in meritocracy. There are two possible reasons
for the fall in mobility: in all cases, the quality of the second signal has increased and so β2
increases. This was the effect described in section 3.3 where firms get better at picking out the
talented but they also tend to be from rich backgrounds; additionally, in some cases (all cases for
which α > 1) the first signal is also used more, reducing mobility since it directly relates to family
background.
We also investigated whether the correlation of an individual’s talent and income increased with
a fall in σ2s2 . If it did not, a fall in σ
2
s2 would not be a useful way of exogenously shocking
meritocracy. It occurred in all cases.
In addition to investigating the effects of meritocracy we consider the effect of inherited advantages.
An exogenous increase in inherited advantages was defined as a fall in σ2s1 . With a fall in σ
2
s1 ,
it is easier for firms to identify parental income and, since parental income is correlated with
talent, to pay higher incomes to those from richer backgrounds. Thus the advantages of a rich
background (and disadvantages of a poor background) are greater. We decreased σ2s1 by 0.001 and
examined the effects for the parameter sets given in table 1. In all 17,981 cases for which a finite
variance steady state existed, income variance, the intergenerational correlation of incomes, and the
correlation of talent and income increased. Figure 8 illustrates how increases in advantages related
to background (defined as 1σ2s1
) lead to greater income inequality and lower intergenerational
mobility.
In summary, an increase in the precision of either signal (an increase in meritocracy or advan-
tages related to background) will lead to greater income inequality and further increases in both
meritocracy and advantages related to background. This is because the endogenous response of
firms to the more precise information is to use one or both of the signals more. We might have
expected that when firms are better informed about an individual’s talent, they would care less
about his background. We show that more often than not (and in all cases where there is sufficient
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Figure 7: The effect of increasing meritocracy on steady state income variance and mobility
inheritance) this is not true and that even when it is true, mobility still falls due to increased use
of the talent signal.
5 A discrete model with finite income variance
Until now this paper has used a model where income and talent were continuous and normally
distributed. It has been shown, using three variations on the normal model, how multiplicity
may exist, producing two stable steady state outcomes. In the low steady state there was finite
income variance, while the high steady state tended towards infinite income variance. Although
the analysis concentrated on the low steady state, the existence of the infinite variance high steady
state seems less realistic. We now turn to a model with discrete levels of income, which will provide
a simple example of some of the features of the normal model, without the high variance steady
state exhibiting infinite steady state income variance.
As in section 4, firm’s are still unable to observe talent and receive two signals about each worker:
the first, which we will call sr, is a signal on parental income; the second, st, is a signal on talent.
In a departure from the previous models, these signals can only take values of one or zero and their
quality will be determined exogenously. Since there are two signals, each of which can take one
of two values, there are four “types” of individual. Yrt gives the income of each type, for example
Y11 is the income of a type 11 worker (one for whom sr = 1 and st = 1).
Talent, τ , is discrete and only able to take values one or zero. If an individual’s parent is sufficiently
rich, it is more likely to take a value of one. The probability of being talented is given by,
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Figure 8: The effect of increasing advantages on steady state income variance and mobility
P (τ = 1) =

αs + µs (1− αs) if Y˜rt > K˜ 0 ≤ αs ≤ 1
µs if Y˜rt = K˜
µs (1− αs) if Y˜rt < K˜
Srt = P
(
τ = 1|Y˜rt
)
K˜ is average talent in the parent’s generation which, as we will see below, is equal in steady state
to average income in the parent’s generation. Those whose parent’s have above average income are
more likely to be talented than those whose parent’s have below average income. αs is a parameter
controlling inheritance. When αs is zero, everyone has the same probability of being talented,
µs, irrespective of who their parent is. When αs is one, for everyone other than those on the
threshold, talent is entirely determined by parental “type”. Srt is defined to be the probability of
being talented conditional on parental income Y˜rt.
As before, the first signal is on parental income. We will call an individual who looks like she is
from a rich background (sr = 1) “advantaged”, while one who looks like she is from a poor back-
ground (sr = 0) will be termed “disadvantaged”. An individual’s likelihood of being advantaged
is increased if her parent is sufficiently rich. The probability of being advantaged is given by,
P (sr = 1) =

αr + µr (1− αr) if Y˜rt > (1 + λ) K˜ 0 ≤ αr ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λ
µr if Y˜rt = (1 + λ) K˜
µr (1− αr) if Y˜rt < (1 + λ) K˜
Rrt = P
(
sr = 1|Y˜rt
)
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Y˜rt represents parental income so the first line states that an individual’s chances of being advan-
taged are larger if her parent has an income above (1 + λ) K˜. λ is a parameter controlling how
rich your parent needs to be, relative to the average, in order to increase your chances of being
advantaged. αr is a parameter which controls the quality of the signal. If αr is zero then the signal
is randomly distributed in the population and hence not correlated with, or informative about,
parental income. If αr is one, the signal tells exactly whose parents have income above and below
the threshold (1 + λ) K˜. Rrt is defined to be the probability that an individual is advantaged given
her parent’s income is Yrt.
Finally, the second signal, st, is a signal on talent. We will refer to an individual who looks
talented (st = 1) as “promising”, since he is an attractive prospect to a firm, while one which looks
untalented (st = 0) will be referred to to as “unpromising”. The probability that an individual is
promising is given by,
P (st = 1) =
{
αt + µt (1− αt) if τ = 1 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1
µt (1− αt) if τ = 0
This states that an individual is more likely be promising if he is actually talented and unpromising
if he is not. αt measures the quality of the signal, where zero is completely uninformative and one
completely informative. It is going to be our measure of meritocracy, which will increase as αt
goes from zero to one.
In what follows we are going to make the simplifying assumptions that µs = µr = µt = µ.
5.1 Steady state conditions
Let pirt represent the fraction of the population which are of that type. In steady state pirt is
constant across generations. We will begin with pi11, the proportion of individuals who are both
advantaged and promising. The probability that an individual is of type 11 depends on what type
their parent is and what their probability of being 11 is conditional on their parents type. This
gives,5
P (sr = 1, st = 1) = pi11
= µ (1− αt) [R11pi11 +R10pi10 +R01pi01 +R00pi00]
+ αt [R11S11p˜i11 +R10S10p˜i10 +R01S01p˜i01 +R00S00p˜i00]
We define a steady state to be one in which the proportion of each type is constant over time (i.e.
5The proportion of the population which is advantaged and promising is given by,
P (sr = 1, st = 1) = pi11
= P
(
sr = 1|Y˜11
)
P
(
st = 1|Y˜11
)
P
(
Y˜11
)
+ P
(
sr = 1|Y˜10
)
P
(
st = 1|Y˜10
)
P
(
Y˜10
)
+ P
(
sr = 1|Y˜01
)
P
(
st = 1|Y˜01
)
P
(
Y˜01
)
+ P
(
sr = 1|Y˜00
)
P
(
st = 1|Y˜00
)
P
(
Y˜00
)
= R11 [αtS11 + µ (1− αt)] ˜pi11 +R10 [αtS10 + µ (1− αt)] ˜pi10
+R01 [αtS01 + µ (1− αt)] ˜pi01 +R00 [αtS00 + µ (1− αt)] ˜pi00
= µ (1− αt) [R11 ˜pi11 +R10 ˜pi10 +R01 ˜pi01 +R00 ˜pi00]
+ αt [R11S11p˜i11 +R10S10p˜i10 +R01S01p˜i01 +R00S00p˜i00]
The third line uses the fact that P
(
st = 1|Y˜rt
)
= P (st = 1|τ = 1)P
(
τ = 1|Y˜rt
)
+P (st = 1|τ = 0)P
(
τ = 0|Y˜rt
)
and that P
(
Y˜rt
)
= p˜irt since all parents of type rt are paid an income Yrt.
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pirt = p˜irt). We will also define a variable A, which is the proportion of the population which is
both advantaged and talented, and is given by,
A = R11S11pi11 +R10S10pi10 +R01S01pi01 +R00S00pi00
Then our first steady state condition is,
pi11 = αtA+ µ (1− αt) [R11pi11 +R10pi10 +R01pi01 +R00pi00]
Next we want to find the steady state solution for pi10, the proportion of the population that is
advantaged but unpromising. To do so we will actually find the proportion that are advantaged
which equals the unconditional probability that sr = 1. This gives,
6
P (sr = 1) = pi11 + pi10
= R11pi11 +R10pi10 +R01pi01 +R00pi00
By letting pirt = p˜irt and substituting our second steady state equation into our first, we are left
with the following two steady state conditions:
pi11 = αtA+ µ (1− αt) [pi11 + pi10] (16)
pi11 + pi10 = R11pi11 +R10pi10 +R01pi01 +R00pi00 (17)
We derive our next steady state equation by focussing on the proportion of the population which
is promising. K is the proportion of the population which is talented and so is given by,
K = P (τ = 1) = S11p˜i11 + S10p˜i10 + S01p˜i01 + S00p˜i00
or in steady state,
K = P (τ = 1) = S11pi11 + S10pi10 + S01pi01 + S00pi00
Using K, we find the following equation for the steady state proportion of promising individuals,7
6The proportion of the population which is advantaged is given by,
P (sr = 1) = pi11 + pi10
= P
(
sr = 1|Y˜11
)
P
(
Y˜11
)
+ P
(
sr = 1|Y˜10
)
P
(
Y˜10
)
+ P
(
sr = 1|Y˜01
)
P
(
Y˜01
)
+
+ P
(
sr = 1|Y˜00
)
P
(
Y˜00
)
= R11 ˜pi11 +R10 ˜pi10 +R01 ˜pi01 +R00 ˜pi00
7The proportion of the population which is promising is given by,
P (st = 1) = pi11 + pi01
= P (st = 1|τ = 1)P (τ = 1) + P (st = 1|τ = 0)P (τ = 0)
= [αt + µ (1− αt)]K + µ (1− αt) (1−K)
= αtK + µ (1− αt)
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pi11 + pi01 = αtK + µ (1− αt) (18)
Our last steady state equation draws on the fact that the pirt terms for each generation must sum
to one and so,
pi11 + pi10 + pi01 + pi00 = 1 (19)
Equations 16 through 19 can be solved for the four unknowns (pi11, pi10, pi01 and pi00) to give the
steady state proportions of each type in the population.
5.2 The steady state income distribution
Once we have established the steady state distribution of types we can easily define the steady
state income which each type receives. We assume that incomes are paid to each type according
to the probability that they are talented conditional on their observables. So the income of a type
11 individual will be given by,8
Y11 = P (τ = 1|sr = 1, st = 1) = [αt + µ (1− αt)]A
pi11
(20)
By the same logic,
Y10 = P (τ = 1|sr = 1, st = 0) = (1− αt) (1− µ)A
pi10
(21)
Y01 = P (τ = 1|sr = 0, st = 1) = [αt + µ (1− αt)] (K −A)
pi01
(22)
Y00 = P (τ = 1|sr = 0, st = 0) = (1− αt) (1− µ) (K −A)
pi00
(23)
Any solution to equations 16 through 23 gives a full characterisation of a steady state distribution
of income (pi11, pi10, pi01, pi00, Y11, Y10, Y01, Y00). Equations 20 through 23 can also be used to
show that average income is equal to K9.
8The probability that a type 11 individual is talented is given by,
P (τ = 1|sr = 1, st = 1) = P (sr = 1, st = 1|τ = 1)P (τ = 1)
P (sr = 1, st = 1)
=
P (sr = 1|τ = 1)P (st = 1|τ = 1)K
pi11
=
[∑
rt P
(
sr = 1|Y˜rt
)
P
(
Y˜rt|τ = 1
)]
[αt + µ (1− αt)]K
pi11
=
[∑
rtRrtSrtpirt
]
[αt + µ (1− αt)]
pi11
=
[αt + µ (1− αt)]A
pi11
9Average income, Y , is given by Y11pi11 + Y10pi10 + Y01pi01 + Y00pi00 = A+ (K −A) = K
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TFigure 9: The steady states of the economy when αt equals zero. There are two possibilities: (a)everyone has the same probability of being advantaged and so everyone receives the same income;(b) some people are more likely to be advantaged than others and the advantaged are paid more.
5.3 An Example
The goals of this paper, and the focus of the normal model, were two-fold: to demonstrate the
multiplier effect whereby raising income inequality improved information on workers’ quality and
caused firms to pay more varied wages. Where there was sufficient inheritance this led to mul-
tiplicity; and secondly, to demonstrate that a more meritocratic society, defined as one in which
firms are better informed of worker quality, displays lower mobility. When both of these points
are combined, we see that a society in which firms are better informed will lead to both greater
inequality and less mobility in a natural way. We now plan to demonstrate these points within our
discrete model, without having infinite income variance in the high steady state.
5.3.1 The feedback mechanism
We begin by setting αt equal to zero (with λ > 0). This means that the signal on talent is randomly
distributed amongst society and hence uncorrelated with actual talent. It is disregarded by the
firm. This is the situation that was previously described in section 2. I will use an X subscript
to indicate that a signal is irrelevant so, for example, Y1X is the income of an individual who is
advantaged when the talent signal is not being used by the firm. In this situation, there can be at
most two income levels where firms discriminate amongst workers based on whether or not they
are advantaged.
When αt is equal to zero, the simplest steady state occurs where both income levels lie below the
income threshold (1 + λ)K. This implies that all individuals have the same probability of being
advantaged, and so being advantaged or not is not a useful signal to the firm. They disregard it,
along with the talent signal, and pay everyone the same income, K. This common income level can
be shown to equal µ since,
K = P (τ = 1) = P
(
τ = 1|Y˜ = K
)
P
(
Y˜ = K
)
= µ
This steady state is illustrated in figure 9(a) and essentially describes the same steady state as the
zero variance one in section 2. This steady state will always exist.
There is an alternative steady state which can be reached where there are two groups of individuals
with different probabilities of being advantaged. For this to be a steady state, it must be that
the two incomes are sufficiently different so that one group is more likely to be both advantaged
and talented, implying advantage is a useful signal of talent. This implies we require that Y1X >
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TFigure 10: The steady states of the economy when αt is larger than zero but less than λµ1−µ(1 + λ)K and that Y0X < K. It is relatively easy to show that should such a steady state existthere would be a proportion µ of the population who are advantaged and a proportion µ who aretalented. The level of incomes would be given by,Y1X = αrαs + µ (1− αrαs)Y0X = µ (1− αrαs)
This steady state is illustrated in figure 9(b). When the advantaged group is more likely to be
talented, they are paid more, implying they are more likely to be talented. It is similar to the high
steady state in section 2. In particular, this steady state will not always exist (the advantaged
group need to be paid sufficiently more) but is more likely the greater is the inheritability of talent
through parental income.10
5.3.2 The curse of meritocracy I
We now turn our attention to demonstrating how improvements in meritocracy may lead to in-
creased inequality and falling mobility. To do so, we will focus on the low steady state illustrated
in figure 9(a). We will increase meritocracy by increasing αt, the parameter which governs the
information which firms have on an individual’s talent. The resulting steady state is illustrated in
figure 10.
As we increase αt above zero, we produce an economy in which there are two groups of individuals,
one of which is more likely to be talented and hence more likely to be promising. The probability
of being advantaged is the same for everyone. We can see that the proportion in the promising
group in steady state is given by,
P (st = 1) = piX1 = αtK + µ (1− αt)
Similarly we can show that the proportion of talented individuals is given by,
P (τ = 1) = K = αspiX1 + µ (1− αs)
Solving these two equations we find that a proportion µ of the population is promising and that a
proportion µ of the population is talented. The correlation between the membership of these two
groups will determine the extent to which the signal is useful to the firm. This is determined by
αt. It is easy to show that the incomes which the firms will pay are given by,
YX1 = P (τ = 1|st = 1) = αt + µ (1− αt)
YX0 = P (τ = 1|st = 0) = µ (1− αt)
10This steady state exists if λ < αrαs(1−µ)
µ
, so a higher value of αs will improve the likelihood of multiplicity as
in section 2.
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TFigure 11: One steady states of the economy when αt is equal to λµ1−µThe difference in the income paid to the two groups depends on the quality of the informationavailable to the firm, αt. As we increase αt, YX1 increases and YX0 decreases. In addition, asa higher income is paid to those who are promising (those who are more likely to be talented),and those who are promising tend to come from richer backgrounds, this reduces mobility. Theincrease in income dispersion and fall in mobility due to increased use of the talent signal are thesame effects as we saw in section 3.3. This steady state distribution of incomes exists for all αtless than λµ1−µ .11
5.3.3 The curse of meritocracy II
Finally, we want to consider what happens when αt reaches
λµ
1−µ . At this point, YX1 reaches the
threshold (1 + λ)µ and the probability of being advantaged jumps from µ (1− αF ) to µ for the
children of the rich. The fact that some of those from rich backgrounds, who are more likely to be
talented, are also now more likely to be advantaged, means that both signals are now useful to the
firm. There are four income groups formed by each of our previous groups, YX1 and YX0, splitting
in two. The advantaged members of each group move to a higher steady state income, while the
disadvantaged in each group move to a lower steady state income. At this point there are several
steady states which the economy could jump to. I will focus attention on one. This is the one where
Y01 and Y10 do not jump far from YX1 and YX0 respectively so that Y10 < K < Y01 < (1 + λ)K.
12
This is illustrated in figure 11. K is again equal to µ.
As in the normal version of the model we observe complementarity between the two signals. As
we improve the quality of the signal on talent, there will come a point where the firm begins to
use the signal on parental income. This is shown in figure 11. At the point where firms begin
using a person’s advantage to place them in a job there will be a discrete fall in mobility. This
is brought about by the increased inequality associated with improved meritocracy. The idea
that meritocracy can simultaneously increase inequality and lower mobility was one of the central
themes in the previous sections of this paper.
6 Conclusions
In our model, inequality leads to discrimination because people are more different and the sig-
nals they provide more informative. This discrimination feeds back into inequality. This feedback
mechanism may lead to multiplicity of steady states, one with a relatively small amount of discrim-
ination and inequality and one with a relatively large amount of discrimination and ever increasing
inequality.
11At this point YX1 reaches the threshold at which the parental income signal starts to have some value. Although
we did not restrict λ, we will assume that this threshold is less than one otherwise we would never leave this steady
state.
12For this to be the steady state that is reached at αt =
λµ
1−µ we require that αs <
min
{
λ(1−µ)
µαr[λ2+(1+λ)(1−αr)[1−µ(1+λ)]] ,
λµ
αr[λµ+[1−µ(1+λ)]2]
}
.
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There exists a negative correlation between inequality and mobility, which was observed in Corak’s
“Great Gatsby Curve”. We believe this may occur for two reasons: the increased discrimination
which accompanies greater inequality results in firms being better able to identify talent, which is
correlated with parental income; and it may result in them using family background information
more. This move towards greater inequality and lower mobility may be started by an exogenous
increase in the degree of meritocracy in society, which improves the quality of information available
to firms, feeding into discrimination, inequality and further endogenous increases in meritocracy.
These conclusions suggests some policy implications. Suppose the government has a choice to
make between providing funding for pre-school and university education. We would model the
early intervention as a way of relieving the credit constraints on poorer families and ensuring a
good platform of basic skills on which to build for all children. This should weaken the relationship
between talent development and parental income, which in this model refers to a fall in α. Alter-
natively, the university investment would allow the best and the brightest to go on to university
and provide a “Spence-type” signalling opportunity for them. This improved ability to signal their
skills is what we modelled above as a fall in σ2s2 . The implications from the model were that the
university funding would lead to increased inequality and lower mobility. Pre-school investment
would lead to a weakening of the relationship between talent and parental income, making the
parental income signal less useful, lowering discrimination and in turn lowering inequality and
raising mobility. As a result, to the extent that equality and intergenerational mobility are val-
ued by society, we would support public funding of early childhood interventions over university
education.
In terms of future research there are a number of avenues we are currently exploring. Firstly,
we have removed the tournament (or relative) component of talent development to allow the
economy to have growth in average income. Secondly, the discrimination element of our model is
loosely based on the statistical discrimination model of Coate & Loury (1993) but lacks a parental
investment. Including an optmising agent who chooses how much to invest in their child would give
the model a forward-looking channel since parents would be concerned about the expected returns
to investment in their child. This could lead to multiplicity of equilibria, if parents beliefs were
self-fulfilling, in addition to multiplicity of steady states. This is the focus of our current research.
We are also trying to get closer to describing a joint distribution of talent and advantages, which
is an important element in models on the misallocation of talent and central to our understanding
of inequality and mobility.
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